3 ways in General Defences in UK which accused persons may try to prevent themselves from being found guilty of a crime. Or redure their liability for the alleged offence, or lower their sentence if convicted.
TABLE OF CONTENT
- Introduction to General Defences in UK
- The defence of being a minor in UK
- The defence of Insanity
- The defence of Automatism
Introduction to General Defences in UK
There are top 3 ways in General Defences in UK, where accused persons plead not guilty. They may challenge the evidence on matters of fact. By arguing that they have an alibi for the time of the offence who have identified them are mistaken.
Alternatively, defendants may admit the offence, but argue that there is some reason why they should be leniently sentenced. This is an argument that there are mitigating circumstances.
Finally, they may raise a substantive defence, such as self-defence, duress or necessity. The effect of a substantive defence is usually to assert that although the accused may have committed the actus reus with mens rea. There is a legal reason why he or she should not be liable.
> Complete and partial defence
In General Defences in UK there are some defences, such as self-defence, may result in an acquittal. They are described as complete defences. Others result in conviction for a lesser offence. For example, successfully pleading dimintished responsibility or provocation on a charge of murder leads to a conviction of manslaughter.
These are sometimes known as partial defences.
> General and specific defences
Substantive defences may be either general or specific Specific defences are linked to particular crimes. Also cannot be applied to other offences.
For example, provocation is a defence only to murder General defences can be used for a range of different crimes.
>The burden of proof
In a criminal case, the burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. They must prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offence. Rather than defendants having to prove themselves innocent.
On the other hand, defendants who claim they have a substantive defence will be required to provide some proof of it. They cannot simply claim to have acted in self-defence, or expect the court to leave it at that.
The precise nature of the burden of proof depends on the defence which is put forward. Where it is self-defence, provocation, duress, automatism or defendants bear an evidential burden. which means that they must produce some evidence to support the claim.
Once this evidence is produced, the burden of proof passes back to the prosecution. Who have to disprove the defence in order to prove their case. Where the defence put forward is either insanity or diminished responsibility. Defendants bear not only an evidential but also a legal burden: as well as producing evidence of this defence.
They also have to prove to the jury that it was more likely than not that factors amounting to such a defence existed. (This is called proving on a balance of probabilities, a standard of proof usually associated with civil actions).
The Defence of Being a Minor in General Defences in UK
Children under 10 cannot be criminally liable. When they appear to have committed an offence, the social services can be informed but they cannot be prosecuted. If the young person is aged 10 or over, but under 14. There used to be a presumption that they could not form mens rea (known in Latin as doll incapax).
This presumption could be rebutted if the prosecution proved that the young person knew, that what they had done was seriously wrong. A young person with this knowledge was described as having mischievous discretion.
The Divisional Court had suggested, in C (a minor) v DPP (1995). That the presumption against criminal liability for the under 14s no longer existed. On the grounds that with compulsory education young people matured much more quickly than in the past.
On appeal the House of Lords rejected this approach. Stating that there was a line of cases dating back many years. Making it clear that the presumption did exist. It such an important and drastic change in the law were to be made, it should come from Parliament, not the courts.
The House observed that, while the Law Commission had proposed abolishing the presumption in 1985. The Government chose not to adopt this proposal in its 1990 review of the law. The defendant’s appeal was allowed because, on the facts, the prosecution had failed to provide clear and positive evidence. That the child in the case knew what he was doing was wrong.
However, in 1998 Parliament enacted s.34 of the Crime and Disorder Act which abolished the presumption of dali incapax. As part of the Government’s fight against youth crime. Section 34 states,
“The rebuttable presumption of criminal law that a child aged 10 or over is incapable of committing an offence is hereby abolished.“
This would appear to be short and simple but there was some confusion as to whether the abolition of the presumption implied with it. The abolition of the defence, or whether the defence was separate from the presumption and survived after its abolition.
Nigel Walker (1999) argued that all that was abolished was the common law presumption, and that the defence remained. Thus it would still be open to the defence to prove that a child lacked mischievous discretion.
If the approach had been accepted then the only change made by the legislation would have been a change in the burden of proof, from the prosecution to the defence.
Key Case
RvT (2009)
The House of Lords has now ruled in RvT (2009) that the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has abolished the defence of doli incapax. Altogether and not just changed the burden of proof. The case involved a 12-year-old boy accused of causing or inciting other boys under 13 to engage in sexual activity. Contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
When interviewed by the police the boy admitted the sexual activity. But claimed he did not think what he was doing was wrong.
The House reached its interpretation of the Act by looking at the government reports that preceded the introduction of the legislation and the parliamentary debates and concluded that abolition was the clear intention of Parliament:
“Parliament was in no doubt as to the meaning of the clause, in part perhaps because in the consultation paper and the White Paper that preceded the legislation the Home Office had made it quite clear what was meant by abolition of the presumption of doli incapax.“
Legal Principle
The doctrine of dalk incapizx has been abolished by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
The Defence of Insanity in General Defences in UK
The defence of insanity, also known as insane automatism. Actually has little to do with madness, or with any medical definition of insanity. The concept is given a purely legal definition. As a result, it has been held to include conditions such as sleep-walking and epilepsy. Despite the fact that doctors would never label such conditions as forms of insanity.
Where the defence of insanity is successful a special verdict will be given of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’. In order for this verdict to be given the prosecution must have proved the actus reus of the offence but not the existence of the mens rea.
The defendant’s state of mind will only be relevant to the issue of insanity – Attorney- General’s Reference (No 3 of 1998) (1999)
As well as being put forward by the accused, a defence of insanity may be raised by the prosecution if the defendant makes their mental state an issue in the case, for example by raising a defence of automatism or diminished responsibility.
In such situations the prosecution can then try to prove that the defendant was insane when the offence was committed. Rather than suffering from diminished responsibility or automatism. A judge may raise the issue of insanity in very exceptional circumstances.
Key Case:
R v Dickie (1984)
In R v Dickie (1984), the accused was charged with arson and introduced evidence of extreme hyperactivity. The judge decided that this evidence required a direction to the
jury on insanity.
The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against the verdict. Saying that the judge should only interfere if all the medical evidence suggested insanity and the General Defences were deliberately evading the issue.
The case of R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex p K (1996) made it clear. That the defence is available to summary. As well as indictable offences. The defence of insanity is not available for strict liability offences. Thus, in DPP v H (1997) the defendant was charged with drink driving. He suffered from manic depressive psychosis. But he had no defence of insanity as drink driving is a strict liability offence.
In the past, successfully pleading insanity meant only one possible result a hospital order
under which the accused could be detained for an indefinite period of time. Consequently,
once the death penalty was abolished, most defendants preferred to plead guilty to an offence rather than raise the defence of insanity. On the grounds that the punishment was unlikely to be worse than being locked away in a mental hospital with no fixed date for their release.
When the defence of diminished responsibility was introduced for murder in 1957. This defence could be raised instead of pleading insanity, and insanity is now successfully put forward in only two or three cases a year. The Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 has altered the situation by
introducing various sentencing options. The court may make:
> a hospital order (with or without a restriction order)
> a supervision order
> an order for absolute discharge
A court can only make a hospital order if there is medical evidence that justifies detention. Because of the defendant’s mental state. If insanity was brought on by a physical condition (such as diabetes). Then the only option open to the court is a supervision order in the community or an absolute dis- charge.
These changes are likely to encourage defendants to put forward the defence of insanity in the future Professor Mackay (2012) has identified a repeated underuse of the insanity defence over the years, with large numbers of mentally ill offenders being held in prisons. But very few choosing to raise the defence of insanity. With the changes in outcome for the insanity defence, his research is identifying a gradual increase in the use of the General Defences, though the numbers are still very small.
He found 34 verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity in 2011, with the defence succeeding in only a fifth of the cases in which it was raised.
In R v Oye (2013) (discussed on p. 385), the defence of insanity succeeded on appeal. Having been found not guilty by reason of insanity the defendant was given an absolute discharge on the basis, that he had fully recovered from his psychosis. So a hospital order or a supervision order would not serve any purpose
Defect of reason
A defect of reason means being deprived of the power to reason, rather than just failing to use it. In R v Clarke (1972), Mrs Clarke was accused of shoplifting, and argued that she had been acting absentmindedly because she was suffering from depression. The court ruled that this evidence meant she was denying mens rea, rather than raising the General Defences of insanity. As there was doubt over her mens rea her appeal was allowed.
It does not matter whether the defect of reason was temporary or permanent. Thus, in Ry Sul- livan (1984), the defendant was treated as suffering from a defect of reason. When he suffered from an epileptic fit which is inevitably a temporary state. In R v Smith (Mark) (2012) the defendant had been on holiday in Thailand.
In the last three days of his holiday he was unwell and then he travelled by boat and road for 17 hours to reach the capital, Bangkok. During which he may have suffered from heat stroke caused by exposure to the sun. On the flight back to England he was suffering from sleep deprivation and exhaustion.
He became persuaded that suicide bombers were on board the plane and planned to detonate bombs using the plane’s remote controls. The defendant began racing up and down the plane, frantically removing the remote controls and then attempting to open a rear departure door.
He was judged not guilty by reason of insanity and was granted an unconditional discharge because his condition had quickly corrected itself. And there was no need for him to get medical treatment.
Disease of the mind
This & a legal definition, not a medical one, and covers states of mind which doctors would be highly unlikely to charactense as diseases of the mind. In legal terms it means a malfunctioning of the mind, and this has been held to include a hardening of the arteries. Which is called arteno- sclerosis-Rv Kemp (1957), epilepsy – R v Sullivan (1984), diabetes – Rv Hennessy (1989), and sleepwalking-Rv Burgess (1991).
In Kemp, the defendant hit his wife with a hammer, causing her grievous bodily harm. He was suffering from arteriosclerosis, which caused temporary blackouts. Evidence showed he was devoted to his wife, and could not remember picking up the hammer or attacking her.
In medical terms, arteriosclerosis is not considered to be a disease that affects the brain, but the court held that for the General Defences of insanity, the ‘mind’ meant the ordinary mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding’, rather than the brain in the physical sense.
The courts draw a distinction between a disease of the mind caused by an internal factor and one caused by an external factor. In the fornier the relevant General Defences is insane automatism, in the latter it is automatism.
Example:
An example of a situation in which a disease of the mind is caused by some external factor is where someone is knocked on the head or undergoes hypnotism. This distinction was drawn in Sullivan. The appellant kicked and injured a friend during an epileptic fit, and was charged with inflicting grievous bodily harm.
Medical evidence suggested that he would not have been aware, during the fit, that he was kicking anyone. The House of Lords held that epilepsy was a disease of the mind, because during a fit mental faculties could be impaired to the extent of causing a defect of reason.
The internal/external divide was applied strictly in R v Burgess (1991). Burgess and a friend, Miss Curtis, had spent the evening watching videos at her flat. She fell asleep and while sleeping Burgess hit her over the head with a bottle and the video recorder and then grasped her throat.
She cried out and he seemed to come to his senses, showing considerable distress at what he had done. Having been charged with wounding with intent under s. 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, he argued that he fell within the defence of automatism.
The judge said the appropriate delence on the facts was insanity. Burgess was found not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered to be detained in a secure hospital. His appeal was dismissed on the grounds that as his sleepwalking was caused by an internal factor. The judge had given the correct direction.
Even diabetes, a disease which affects 3 million people in the UK and which is in no medical sense a disease of the brain, has been treated in law as insanity. Diabetes is a disease which affects the body’s ability to use sugar it is usually controlled by injections of insulin. The substance which the body uses to break down sugar.
Problems can arise where diabetics either fail to take their insulin, causing high blood sugar and what is known as a hyperglycaemic episode, or take the insulin and then drink alcohol, or fail to eat when they should, this causes low blood sugar and is known as a hypoglycaemic episode.
Either situation may lead the diabetic to behave aggressively. Which is why the problem has been brought to the attention of the courts. The result has been a rather odd approach, in which hyperglycaemic episodes are regarded as insanity. Because they are caused by an internal factor the action of the diabetes when insulin is not taken – while hypoglycaemic episodes are regarded as non-insane automatism. Because they are caused by an external factor, the insulin.
Key Case 1
R v Hennessy (1989)
In R v Hennessy (1989), the accused was a diabetic, charged with taking a vehicle and driving while disqualified. He gave evidence that at the time of the offence he had failed to take his usual dose of insulin due to stress and depression, and as a result was suffering from hyperglycaenia. Which it was argued put him in a state of automatism.
The trial judge ruled that since this state had been caused by diabetes. A disease, the proper defence was one of insanity under the M’Naghten rules Hennessy then pleaded guilty (since successfully pleading insanity would have led to com mittal to a mental institution). And then appealed against his conviction. His appeal was dismissed.
By contrast, in R v Quick (1973), the diabetic defendant was a nurse at a psychiatric hospital, who attacked a patient. He daimed that due to hypoglycaemia, brought on by not eating after taking insulin, he had acted without knowing what he was doing.
The judge directed that this was a plea of insanity, upon which Quick changed his plea to guilty On appeal, it was held that the alleged mental condition was not caused by diabetes, but by the insulin used to treat it, and his appeal was allowed.
Key Case 2
in R v Coley, McGhee and Harris (2013) Coley was 17 years old and living with his parents. He had consumed some strong cannabis all day and then gone to bed. He had got up in the night, dressed himself in dark clothes and put on a black balaclava. Having taken a large 9-inch ‘Rambo- style knife from his collection, he walked into his neighbour’s house using some keys they had given his family to look after.
He went upstairs and opened the door into the main bedroom where his neighbour was in bed with her partner. The neighbour’s partner got out of bed and confronted Coley, at which point Coley stabbed him seven times causing serious injuries. At his trial for attempted murder he claimed he had blacked out and did not have any recollection of what had happened.
The expert psychiatric evidence suggested the defendant was not suffering from any underlying mental illness or personality disorder. But it was very likely his consumption of cannabis had triggered a psychotic episode (a temporary abnormality of the mind which made him detached from reality).
He may have been acting out the role of a character in a computer game. The trial judge refused to leave the General Defences of insanity to the jury and the Court of Appeal agreed. The court observed.
If the doctors were right about his state of mind, his mind was to an extent detached from reality by the direct and acute effects on it of the ingestion of cannabis. Every intoxicated person has his mirid affected, and to an extent disordered, by the direct and acute effects of the ingestion of intoxicants, all intoxication operates through the brain. Not infrequently it would be perfectly legitimate to say of a very drunken man that his mind had become detached from reality by the intoxication In order to engage the law of insanity, it is not enough that there is an effect on the mind or in the language of the Mlaghten rules, a 'defert of reason There must also be what the law classifies as a disease of the mind.The psychotir episode had been caused by an external factor (the cannabis) and not the defendant’s inherent psychological makeup. So the defence of insanity could not apply.
The Court of Appeal stated that voluntarily consumed intoxicants having a direct and acute effect on the mind will not, in themselves, give rise to a General Defences of insanity.
This was a case of voluntary intoxication. so the key question was whether he had the mens rea at the time the offence was committed. The jury had concluded he did.
The disease of the mind may need to manifest itself in violence in Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland (1963) Lord Denning said,
“Any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to rerur is a disease of the mind Thus some mental disorders which do not manifest themselves in violence, such as kleptomania la compulsion to steal) are not diseases of the mind for the purposes of the defence of insanity”.
On the other hand, Lord Denning’s state ment that the mental disorder must be ‘prone to recur’ was not followed by Lord Lane in Burgess. The expert evidence in that case was that there was no reported incident of a sleepwalker being repeatedly violent.
As Lord Lane concluded that the mental disorder need not be ‘prone to recur the defendant still fell within the defence of insanity
Once a suitable disease of the mind has been proved, the General Defences must also prove that the disease of the mind meant that the defendant lacked knowledge as to the nature and quality of the act, or that the act was wrong
The nature and quality of the act
In R v Codere (1916) this was held to mean the physical, rather than the moral, nature of the act. A classic example of not knowing the nature and quality of an art is where the defendant cuts the victim’s throat under the delusion of slicing a loaf of bread. It is not that they do not realise cutting someone’s throat is wrong, but that they do not know they are cutting someone’s throat. A person who has lost control of him or herself would not satisfy this requirement.
Knowledge that the act was wrong
This has been held to mean legally rather than morally wrong. In R v Windle (1952) the accused killed his suicidal wife with an overdose of aspirin. When giving himself up to the police, he said, I suppose they will hang me for this. There was medical evidence that although he was suffering from a merital illness. He knew that poisoning his wife was legally wrong. The Court of Appeal upheld his coriviction and he was hanged
This interpretation of the law was confirmed in R v Johnson (2007). The defendant had stabbed the victim. He was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, but the medical evidence stated that while he thought he had a moral right to do as he did, he still knew that what he had done was legally wrong. The Court of Appeal held that in those circumstances the General Defences of insanity was not available to him
In R v Coley, McGhee and Harris (2013) the defendant, Harris, had aliruptly stopped binge drinking which, about five days later, had triggered a psychotic episode. And he had set light to his house.
When charged with aggravated criminal damage. The Court of Appeal stated the General Defences of insanity could not succeed because, though he had a disease of the mind. He knew what he was doing and he knew it was wrong there was evidence he had removed important documents from the house before he started the fire
The defence of automatism in General Defences in UK
The defence of automatism (sometimes known as “sane automatom) is available where defendants act involuntarily as a result of an external factor which was not their own fault.
Involuntary act
Therefore defendarits will have a complete defence if they can show that, at the time of the alleged offence, they had completely lost control of their bodily movements, rendering their conduct involuntary. The defence was discussed by the Court of Appeal in Bratty Attorney-General for Northern Ireland (1963):
“No act a punishable if it is done invoruntarily and an involuntary act in this context some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as automatism-means an act which is done by the muscles without any contrat by the mind such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion, or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing [However) to prevent confusion it is to be observed that in the criminal law an act is not to be regarded as an involuntary act simply because the actor tioes not remember it. Nor is an act to be regarded as art involuntary act simply because the deer could not controi his impuise to do it”.
The law in General Defences gives the detence a very narrow interpretation, emphasising that there must be a totar loss of voluntary control. Any evidence of the defendant controlling his or her actions, such as stopping at traffic lights, will rule out the defence.
Key Case
The case of Broome v Perkins (1987) shows the limited scope of the General Defences. The accused got into a hypoglycaemic state and, during this period, drove home very erratically from work, hitting another car at one point.
Afterwards he could remember nothing about the journey but, seeing the damage to his car, reported himself to the police. Medical evidence suggested that it was possible for someone in his state to complete a familiar journey without being conscious of doing so, and that.
Although his awareness of what was going on around him would be imperfect, he would be able to react sufficiently to steer and operate the car, even though not very well.
The court held that since the accused was able to exercise some voluntary control over his movements. He had not been acting in an entirely involuntary manner, and therefore the defence of automatism was not available
This decision was heavily criticised as being too harsh. But it was nevertheless followed in Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 1992). When driving a lorry down a motorway, the accused crashed into a car parked on the hard shoulder, killing two people.
Expert evidence showed that while he had not fallen asleep at the wheel. He had been put into a trance-like state by the repettion of the long flat road which reduced. But did not eliminate, awareness of what he was doing. On acquittal the prosecution raised the case as an issue of law in the Court of Appeal.
That court concluded that his state did not amount to automatism. Again implying that reduced awareness cannot amount to the defence. Thus, the trial court got the law wrong and the defendant should probably not have been acquitted.
In R v Coley, McGhee and Harris (2013) Coley had consumed a large amount of strong cannabis. He had a psychotic episode (a temporary abnormality of the mind which made him detached from reality). And stabbed his neighbour, seriously injuring him.
Result :
The trial judge rejected the defence of automatism. In rejecting the defendant’s appeal, the Court of Appeal observed automatism requires the ‘complete destruction of voluntary control . And that ‘the movements or actions of the defendant at the material time were wholly involuntary.
The accused does not have to be unconscious, in the sense of comatose, but a condition which could be described as ‘an absence of conscious action. Clearly fell short of involuntary action. ‘Involuntary is not the same as irrational or disinhibited.
Being affected by delusionis or hallucinations, would make your behaviour rational. But not involuritary Coley was ‘capable of complex organised behaviour and so his actions were not wholly involuntary.
The second appellant in the case, McGhee, had stabbed a shop assistant after having consumed alcoliol and prescription drugs. The Court of Appeal noted the expert evidence indicated disinhibited behaviour. Rather than behaviour over which McGhee had no voluntary control. Camera footage recorded of the incident in the shop also showed McGhee’s conduct was voluntary
Rumbold and Wasik (2011) have argued that if automatism requires a complete loss of voluntary control the defence would be useless. Because surh a person would not be able to undertake the most basic human activity. Such as walking, so it would be impossible to carry out a crime in this condition.
External cause in General Defences
A distinction is drawn between sane automatism and insane automatism (the latter is the defence of insanity). Sarie automatism is caused by an external factor buch as being banged on the head by a hammer or stung by a bee). Insane automatism is caused by an internal factor (a disease of the mind).
It was on this basis on General Defences that the courts distinguished between Quick and Hennessy (see above). Stating that Hennessy’s hyperglycaemia was triggered by an internal factor (his diabetes). And was therefore within the legal definition of insanity. But the causes of Quick’s hypoglycaemia were the insulin he had taken. And the fact that he had drunk alcohol and not eaten. All external factors, and so he could successfully raise the defence of automatism.
Hennessy’s counsel had argued that the hyperglycaernia was caused by the defendant’s failure to take insulin. Which in turn was caused by stress and depression, which, it was suggested, were external factors.
But in the Court of Appeal Lord Lane stated in our judgment, stress, and depression can no doubt be the result of the operation of external factors. But they are not, it seems to us. In themselves separately or together external factors of the kind capable in law of causing a state of automatism.
The Court of Appeal pointed out that they were prone to recur and lacked the feature of novelty or accident. The kind of external factors the law in General Defences required would be something like a blow to the head, or an anaesthetic.
Since the Criminal Procedure finsanity and Unfitness to Plead) Art 1991. The difference between a finding of sane automatom and a finding of insane automatism has lost some of its importance
Self-induced automatism in General Defences in UK
The defence of automatism will not be available if the automatism was caused by the accused’s own fault. Where someone lases control of their artions through drinking too much, or taking illegal drugs, the detence is unavailable, for obvious reasons of policy.
Where the accused brings about the automatom in some other way. The availability of the defence will depend on whether they knew there was a risk of getting into such a state.
In R v Bailey (1983) the defendant was a diabetic. Who attacked and injured his ex-girlfriend’s new boyfrend during a bout of hypoglycaernia. Feeling unwell beforehand, he had eaten some sugar but no other food.
The Court of Appeal held that self-induced automatism (other than that caused by drink or drugs) can provide a defence. If the accused’s conduct does not amount to reck- lessness, taking into account his knowledge of the likely results of anything he has done or failed to do.
In Bailey’s case this meant that he would have a defence if he did not realise that failing to eat would put him into a state. In which he might attack someone without realising it. If he was aware of this, and still failed to eat, he was reckless. And the defence ought not to be available.
Thus the defence is not available. If the defendant was reckless (rather than merely negligent). A defendant will only be reckless if he appreciated the risk of his behaviour becoming ‘aggressive with the result that he may cause some injury to others.
Results:
The accused in R v Clarke (2009) was a diabetic. Who was meticulously careful about making sure his blood sugar level stayed steady. On the relevant occasion, despite cherking his blood sugar level just before setting off. He suffered a hypoglycaemic episode. while driving, his driving became erratic and he knocked down and killed a child.
He was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving and his appeal was rejected. The Court of Appeal concluded that the jury must have decided the accused had. At least briefly, become aware of the onset of the hypoglycaernic episode and failed at that point to stop driving.
Should a defendant take drugs which normally have a soporific or sedative effect, and then commit a come involuntarily. The defence of automatism may be available, if their reaction to the drug was unexpected in R v Hardie (1984). A person whose condition of autornatism was due to taking Valium la tranquilliser) could rely on the defence. Even though the drug had not been prescribed by a doctor.
In R v Coley, McGhee and Harris (2013). The Court of Appeal observed that the defence of automatism is not available to a defendant who has induced an acute state of involuntary behaviour by his own fault. On the facts of the case, consuming a large amount of strong cannabis before committing the offence.
